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Inflection points and industry change: 
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Abstract
We examine whether the ‘strategic inflection points’ described by former Intel CEO 
Andy Grove correspond to mathematical inflection points in the product/technology 
life cycle. We find one sense in which they do and two senses in which they do not. 
This leads to a mapping of colloquial uses of inflection point, tipping point, volatility, 
chaos, and turbulence against the scientific definitions of these terms. The mapping 
should be of use to researchers and educators, and also suggests to managers that 
the possibility of foresight and control in technology-dependent industries is more 
sharply limited than generally believed. The paper highlights implications for orga-
nizational sustainability and offers possible coping mechanisms for managers and 
directions for educators and researchers.
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INTRODUCTION
Calculus students, who know the inflection point in an s-shaped growth curve is where things start to slow down, would have been confused by Andy Grove’s use of ‘strategic inflection point’ to mean ‘the nightmare 
moment… when massive change occurs and a company must, virtually 
overnight, adapt or fall by the wayside’ (Phillips, 2007). 
Two points jump from the inset above: First, there is confusion about the 
term ‘inflection point,’ and second, such points – at least in Grove’s definition 
– are substantial threats to the enterprise’s sustainability. The first reaction to a 
‘nightmare moment,’ according to Laakso et al. (2013) is to ensure all parties 
share a common vocabulary for dealing with it.
We therefore begin this paper by addressing and clarifying the terminology 
of instability in technology businesses. In so doing, we bring together diverse 
literature, a mathematical derivation, and short cases to show that the “middle” 
portion of a technology/product diffusion cycle is not the predictable domain 
that earlier literature had implied. Recent research, as well as our analysis and 
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our original case, shows that waves of product revitalizations, plus chaotic 
or quasi-chaotic transitions, result in alternating periods of stability and 
instability. From this finding and from our clarification of terms, we are able to 
draw recommendations for managers and educators.
In the sections that follow, we explore Grove’s idea of inflection points, 
comparing them to ‘tipping points’ and to mathematical inflection points in 
the product/technology life cycle, and examining their relationship to product 
revitalization and technological substitution. We discuss other terms that imply 
technology and business discontinuities, such as turbulence and disruption. We 
summarize a few of Grove’s industry examples, adding a short illustrative case 
of our own. Managerial implications of this investigation are explored, as are 
implications for teachers and researchers.
We suggest measures to recognise the onset of chaos before it is too late, 
and suggest that marketing strategists develop a new attitude about volatility. 
The expected alternation of smooth growth and chaos, and the different 
management styles needed to deal with the two regimes, suggest that (despite 
the obvious organizational difficulties in doing so) companies should consider 
tag-teaming managers over the lifetime of a product line. 
DIFFUSION AND CHAOS
The literature of technology diffusion and market growth has maintained that 
while deterministic chaos may occur at the beginning or ‘end’ of an s-shaped 
market growth curve, the middle section is stable and predictable (Modis and 
Debecker, 1992, Linstone, 1999). Kelly’s (1995) description is clear:
“Growth is extremely sensitive to initial conditions; the first data points 
on a growth curve are almost meaningless. But once a phenomenon 
is on a roll… one can extract from the curve a cross-over point with a 
competing system, or a ‘ceiling’ and a date when the ceiling essentially 
flattens out. If such growing systems are examined at the right time 
(midway in their history), then the presence of local order – summed up 
by the S-curve law – affords [a] pocket of predictability.”  
Thus it was puzzling when former Intel CEO Andy Grove, in his book Only 
the Paranoid Survive, characterised the challenging, make-or-break moments 
of a company’s history as ‘inflection points’ (Grove, 1996a, 1996b). Because 
the inflection point of a symmetric logistic or Bass (1969) growth curve is 
in the stable region, one would expect these challenging moments to occur 
near the start-up of growth, or near saturation or maturity, when technological 
substitutes start to enter the scene. That is, not at the mathematical inflection 
point of the s-curve, where its second derivative changes sign (see Figure 1). 
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rather than for mathematical precision? Why does the question matter?
Subsequent writers have used related scientific terms – disruption, tipping 
points, chaos, etc. – in ways that are informal or metaphorical, diverging from 
earlier definitions in the hard sciences and engineering. This paper reviews 
these usages that address aspects of business and technological instability, 
bringing them together “under one roof,” characterising and clarifying them, 
and finally summarizing them in Table 1. 
Followers of chaos theory will recall that prediction and control are 
impossible once a trajectory has entered a chaotic regime. Whereas Phillips 
(2007) mined the Bass equation for evidence of the best time to stop advertising, 
we now look at the increased advertising and promotion pulses that underlie 
product revitalization initiatives, and their dangers. Our development of the 
structural similarity of product revitalization and technological substitution 
– added to evidence from the literature – implies that chaos may arise in 
managerial situations more frequently than has been realised heretofore. It is 
now clear that a revitalization attempt can lead to uncontrollable fluctuations, 
making it possibly more risky than refraining from attempted revitalization. 
Modis and Debecker’s (1992) implication that ‘The generalised picture [of 
market evolution] is one of alternating states of logistic growth and chaos’ is 
consistent with Grove’s observations.
GROVE’S STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINTS
Grove popularised the expression ‘inflection point’ as a business term. 
Mathematically, an inflection point is a point on a curve at which the tangent 
crosses the curve itself. Grove defines inflection point as a strategic point in the 
life of a business or project when its fundamentals are changing significantly. 
‘Point’ is really a misnomer because it may be a long, sometimes painful 
period of change.  In business terms, it means something new is happening 
and there’s no going back; no more ‘business as usual’. 
In Grove’s (1996b) words: Strategic inflection points can be caused by 
technological change but they are more than technological change... 
They are full-scale changes in the way business is conducted, so that 
simply adopting new technology or fighting the competition as you 
used to may be insufficient. They build up force so insidiously that 
you may have a hard time even putting a finger on what has changed, 
yet you know that something has. Let’s not mince words: A strategic 
inflection point can be deadly when unattended to. 
Strategic inflection points do not always result in catastrophe. Strategic 
inflection points can be opportunities for businesses that prepare and possess 
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skills for dealing with the new changes. This may mean opportunities for a 
new period of growth. Grove affirms that any businesses can be both the sub-
ject of and the cause of a strategic inflection point; he believes Intel has been 
both.
Figure 1: At the inflection point, an s-curve shifts from convex to concave
Grove suggested that the IT (information technology) industry was on the cusp 
of a new inflection point in 1996. ‘We live,’ he wrote then, ‘in an age in which 
the pace of technological change is pulsating ever faster, causing waves that 
spread outward toward all industries’ (Grove, 1996b). This change has had 
huge impacts and will bring new competition from new ways of living and 
doing businesses. 
INFLECTION POINT AS TIPPING POINT
Gladwell (2000) ‘tipping point’ idea enriched the question somewhat. Phillips 
(2007) showed (following Modis (2002)) that logistic curves have no tipping 
points, but that the Bass model can be interpreted in a way that manifests a tipping 
point early in the life of the growth curve, though this tipping point is far from 
the inflection point. Phillips (2007) went on to introduce an extension of the Bass 
model incorporating resistance to change:
Xt+1 – Xt = [p(1 – r + rXt ) + qXt(1 – r + rXt )][1 – Xt ]
In this ‘advertising-imitation-resistance’ or AIR model, Xt is the proportion 
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external influence, r a coefficient of negative influence (resistance to the change), 
and q a coefficient of positive internal influence. The AIR curve is s-shaped and 
monotonically increasing for 0 < r < 1.  It reduces to the Bass model when r = 0.  
This new three-parameter model, having richer ‘intricate structure’ than the 
logistic, Bass, or Fourt and Woodlock (1960)  curves, evinces a greater number 
of tipping points. One of these is the point at which the number of potential imita-
tors who are dissuaded by resistance to change reaches a peak and then declines. 
Though Phillips (2007) specified this point, he neglected to factor a difference-of-
squares term in the formula for its location.
When we factor the term, we see the tipping point occurring when the adopt-
ing fractions Xt + Xt+1 > 1 for the first time. (We refer to the normalised version of 
the s-curve, for which the ‘total market potential’ or ‘total potential adopters’ is set 
to unity or 100%.) This condition can hold only when both Xt and Xt+1 exceed 0.5, 
or when Xt+1 exceeds 0.5 by a margin that makes up for the amount by which Xt 
falls short of 0.5.  That is, this tipping point occurs at or near the inflection point.
Most diffusion literature (inter alia, Rai et al. (1998) and Kelly (1995)) says 
the greatest uncertainty occurs at the product launch, or at the late maturity when 
the product is threatened by more advanced substitutes. The middle, they say, is 
stable and predictable.  Boswijk and Franses’s (2005) observation that the begin-
ning and the end of a product life cycle are characterized, by definition, by zero 
sales, is a viewpoint on the opposite extreme. The middle of the cycle, they rea-
soned, perforce entails more uncertainty than the beginning or the end. Our result 
agrees to a greater extent with that of Loch and Huberman (1999), who maintain 
that uncertainty is evinced throughout the diffusion cycle  start, end, and middle.
The same finding compelled us to take another look at Grove’s terminology. 
Phillips (2007) had shown that an important battle, between proponents of an in-
novation and those resisting it, is won or lost at the inflection point. Grove wrote 
about companies operating in a competitive environment – companies working 
against each other – and this could be seen as one company’s growth being ‘re-
sisted’ by competitive pressures. In this sense, Grove was correct that a serious 
challenge is overcome at an inflection point.
PRODUCT REVITALIZATION: A STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINT?
One of Groves’ illustrations refers to another point in a product line’s life cycle, 
one that is not a ‘natural’ part of the s-curve. See Figure 2. 
Marketers call the line on the upper right of Figure 2 ‘product revitalization’. 
 A common concept in many publications since Levitt’s (1965) article, revitaliza-
tion can result from exploitation of new market niches or new distribution chan-
nels; new technologies that expand the product’s capabilities; finding new uses for 
the product; or from creating and observing new industry standards. When the re-
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vitalization point is conceptualised as an inflection point, the result is the inverted 
s-curve of Figure 2.
Figure 2: A life cycle curve with an inflection point indicating the success 
(top curve) or failure (bottom curve) of a product revitalization. Adapted 
from Grove (1996a).
Revitalization can be motivated by internal factors – in-house innovations, 
understanding that the current product is reaching maturity, wishing to ‘cross the 
chasm’ (Moore, 2002) from the innovator market to the mass market – or by external 
competitive pressure. Sood and Tellis (2004) analyzing twenty-three technologies 
across six markets, conclude that repeated revitalizations (plateaux followed by 
sharp increases) in the cumulative adoption curve are the norm, and that the classical 
s-curve is rarely seen in technology markets in its pure and uninterrupted form. 
The marketing challenge of a product revitalization can be substantial. At first 
take-off, the product may represent a new-to-the-world product category.  Any 
second, post-maturity take-off is within a now-familiar product category, requiring 
quite different marketing skills. 
The lower curve in Figure 2 is a product life-cycle curve. PLC curves are usu-
ally represented as the derivative of the s-curve of cumulative sales or adoption. 
However, perhaps for simplicity of presentation, Grove (1996b) (like Fourt and 
Woodlock (1960), whose model has no coefficient of internal influence) uses an 
arc that lacks the inflection point of the logistic, AIR, or Bass s-curve. (Figure 3 
shows both inflection points.)
Instead, Figure 2 emphasises the inflection point that can result when a product 
is revitalised. This inflection point is not an inherent or ‘natural’ part of a growth 
phenomenon. It is deliberately created by the firm that successfully revitalises its 
product line. Grove uses the term especially for revitalizations that result from 
extreme competitive pressure; that is, not so much revitalization as survival and 
viability following an existential threat. 
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of revitalization based on increasing the coefficient of positive external influence 
(i.e., sharply bumping up the advertising budget) at ‘period 25’. This is shown as 
the upper curve in the Figure; the lower curve shows the natural decline of the 
product’s sales life in the absence of a revitalization. In Figure 4, the revitalization 
is not a mathematical inflection point. Additionally, it is a simplistic representation 
that ignores technological substitution and the possibility of chaotic transition.
Figure 3: Life cycle curve with product revitalization
Figure 4: Numerical illustration of product revitalization, based on AIR 
model, with advertising effect (p parameter) increasing at period 25. Lower-
right curve (circles) show life-cycle alternative to revitalization.
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MODIS-DEBECKER VOLATILITY
We wrote that Grove ‘conceptualised’ the revitalization as an inflection point. 
The fact is that it might not be an inflection point. Modis and Debecker (1992) 
showed the graph (Figure 5) of bituminous coal production in the United 
States, with successive logistic curves fitted, representing the opening of a new 
market niche for the mineral just before mid-century. It is a good illustration 
of their thesis that ‘chaos-like states can be expected before and after logistic 
growth,’ and of Drucker’s  (1968) prescient idea of industrial ‘discontinuities.’
Figure 5: Chaos-like transition from saturation of one market segment and 
initial growth of a new segment. From Modis and Debecker (1992).
The chaos-like states of Modis and Debecker (1992) are generated by certain 
parameter values of an iterated discrete version of the logistic curve. (True 
chaos arises mathematically from continuous functional forms.) They note, 
‘Our approach… does not lead to true chaos. The oscillations we observe die 
out sooner or later… Consequently, our series is a reversible one; from late 
values, one can reconstruct early ones, which is not the case with true chaos’ 
(Modis and Debecker, 1992)
Modis and Debecker (1992) also reproduce a graph of Ausubel et al. 
(1988) showing the same effect for worldwide per capita annual energy con-
sumption. This quasi-chaos may show itself at the end of a logistic growth 
cycle, but not in the middle. Interestingly, this data series appears to capture 
the ‘precursor’ false jump at the early launch phase, often seen as a result of 
channel-loading, marketing hype, or the early tipping point of the Bass and 
AIR models in which imitation effects are about to outstrip advertising effects, 
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chaos seems to capture as well as the ‘overshoot’ in the late cycle which may 
be caused by hoarding of an item which is expected to be removed from the 
market. Modis and Debecker (1992) remark, ‘The chaotic fluctuations belong 
to the end of [one] growth phase as much as to the beginning of the next one…. 
Associating a peak with the past as an overshoot, or with the future as a precur-
sor, is in some cases a simple question of taste.’ 
Thus a chaotic or quasi-chaotic transition between market niches (a revi-
talization) may appear to be an inflection point because the process is observed 
and recorded at discrete intervals, potentially disguising the chaotic fluctua-
tions (Phillips and Kim, 1996). As Modis and Debecker (1992) put it, ‘The line 
appears smooth because of rapid sampling.’
TECHNOLOGICAL SUBSTITUTION
Though technology substitution is usually pictured as an x-shaped crossing of 
two mirror-image s-curves representing market share (Fisher and Pry, 1971), 
substitution is sometimes portrayed as successive s-curves as in Figure 6. Fig-
ures 5 and 6 differ in that Figure 5 shows a revitalization (opening of new 
markets) leading to increased sales (shown on the vertical axis), and Figure 6 
shows on its vertical axis improved product performance due to technological 
advance.
Figure 6: Technological substitution represented as successive s-curves 
(Brinker, 2008).
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The implication of Figure 6 is that the enhanced performance/cost ratio of the 
new technology will enlarge the potential market. (The Fisher-Pry model does 
not explicitly show total market growth, but does not rule it out.) However, the 
area in the shaded oval represents the end of one growth curve and the start 
of another, just as in Figure 5. It suggests, correctly, that chaos is possible. In 
a similar diagram, Dimov et al. (2008) label this region ‘disruption’. See also 
Christensen (1998).
When Company A’s product line depends on a mature technology, and 
competitor Company B’s product line depends on a newer and innovative 
technology, the technology substitution process poses a strategic threat to 
Company A. To remain viable, A must upgrade. Thus a new, substituting tech-
nology may represent a singular strategic challenge for an incumbent firm – a 
‘chaotic transition’ in both the technical and vernacular senses – but not a true 
inflection point. This was certainly the case with the successive generations of 
microprocessors produced by Intel and its competitors.
TURBULENCE AND DISRUPTION
Both Drucker (1993) and Ansoff and McDonnell (1990); see also Seet (2005) 
used the word turbulence to describe non-stable business environments, and 
Ansoff constructed a subjective rating scale for environmental turbulence. Thus, 
business use of the term has differed from the original usage of turbulence, in 
fluid dynamics. Wolfram (2002) avers that fluid turbulence has a component of 
randomness as well as one of deterministic chaos.
Christensen (1998) noted that many a business has failed due to ignoring 
‘disruptive technologies.’ The disruptive technologies notion is valuable, 
and pertinent here due to its connection to technology substitution, but is a 
‘smaller’ idea than inflection points because it does not imply sweeping 
changes in society, industry, technology, and politics. (To the extent that it 
was a disruptive technology, the substitution of transistors for vacuum tubes 
came close to causing such sweeping changes, however.) Like Ansoff and 
McDonnell (1990) and Drucker (1968), Christensen (1998) introduced a new 
word usage. Christensen (1998) contributes by focusing on the individual and 
organizational psychology of denial in the face of technological change
Kaplan et al. (2003) using 23 years of data from 15 pharmaceutical firms, 
showed that senior executives’ vision concerning the future importance of 
biotechnology shaped firms’ responses to the revolution in that field. They 
conclude that ‘cognition at the most senior level can play a critical role in 
shaping established firms’ response to discontinuities’. 
STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINTS: CASES
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of ‘inflection points,’ including Wal-Mart, Apple, and Barnes & Noble. We 
add a lengthier case, centered on technological changes in the survey research 
industry in the 1980s, that brings home the discussion of techno-managerial 
discontinuities.
Grove (1996a) cites as an example the situation of Wal-Mart entering new 
markets with its superior logistics system, high technology inventory manage-
ment system, large-volume-based purchase costs, and systematic company-
wide training programs. This had a huge impact on small local stores, causing 
them either to lose business or to find new niches. Accompanying changes in 
cargo handling and containerization augmented this strategic shift, and created 
a parallel one in transport industries.
Changes in technology influence customers to change their purchasing be-
haviour. Grove discusses Barnes & Noble, the giant book retailer that has had 
to deal with upstart Internet-based booksellers. At the time, Barnes & Noble 
had not only managed to eclipse them in sales but eclipse them in market valu-
ation. Amazon.com then had more than a half billion dollars of revenue and 
has become the giant of online selling. To survive, Barnes & Noble have had to 
change the way they do business; they attempted this by focusing on combined 
‘bricks and clicks’ selling.  Grove called this another strategic inflection point 
in the retail business.  
The strategic inflection point in the computing industry was the period that 
began with the introduction of PCs. Grove writes of Steve Jobs, the late CEO 
of Apple, who created an extremely successful personal computer company. 
Another example is the change in the software industry. Grove notes that Mi-
crosoft, which entered the business to compete with Apple, caused a massive 
change in the software industry, ultimately pushing Apple to innovate in busi-
ness models for the music and telephone industries. The current generation of 
young people in the United States has been using computers since grammar 
school and now takes them for granted. That is a significant change that has 
created more strategic inflection points. 
One of us experienced a strategic inflection point while working in the 
market research industry (Phillips, 2001). Since the 1930s, Market Research 
Corporation of America (MRCA) had conducted purchase behaviour surveys, 
and the A.C. Nielsen Company concentrated on media audience measurement. 
The 1960s saw the mathematical revolution in market research, with new 
algorithms for predicting brand shifting, purchase frequencies, and other 
marketing phenomena. The advent of commercial database software in the 
1970s made this easier. Laser scanners could now be used to record purchases 
of an item at a supermarket checkout. On the consumer side, increasing 
affluence and increasing divorce rates changed the profiles, buying habits, and 
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survey response rates of US households. 
At the time, few stores used checkout scanners. In 1979, Information Resources 
Inc., aiming to revolutionise consumer surveys, raised enough IPO capital to give 
scanners to every supermarket in a half-dozen ‘pod markets’ throughout the US, 
in return for rights to the checkout data. Nielsen soon followed suit with its own 
scanner ventures. For the first time, supermarket purchases could be automatically 
recorded and linked to households with known characteristics. Because this 
seemed ‘objective’ and eliminated key-entry tasks, manufacturers were excited 
about the prospect of more accurate data, and were motivated to shun MRCA’s 
paper-and-pencil data collection methods in favour of the newer services.
At first, they were disappointed. ‘Universal’ Product Codes (UPCs) did not 
uniquely identify products. Local pod markets could not produce nationally 
projectible data. Sample members forgot to take their ID cards to the supermarket. 
Processing voluminous scanner data was error-prone. Through the mid-1990s, 
studies reported that up to 9% of prices shown at the scanner checkout differed from 
the prices marked on shelves or packages, or were otherwise in error. K-Marts, gas 
stations and department stores did not own scanners, but sold significant amounts 
of foods and other fast-moving consumer goods. It took manufacturers several 
months to see that these problems compromised the actionability of their market 
research data. They began to re-subscribe to MRCA’s service – raising false hopes 
within MRCA. The scanner survey firms were experiencing a ‘hype curve’ – the 
interrupted growth curve so frequently seen in technology industries – while the 
same events produced a strategic inflection point for MRCA.
Market research companies had always been considered service businesses, 
using debt financing rather than equity. The idea of venture backing and IPOs was 
foreign to the industry. MRCA, a privately held company, did not wish to dilute 
ownership in order to raise capital and risk it in a ‘me too’ scanner panel offering. 
MRCA examined its core strengths, and decided to compete not on the basis of 
data collection technology but on the basis of analysis, reporting, and customer 
service technology. MRCA introduced the industry’s first PC-based consumer 
panel data analysis and presentation tool (Phillips, 1985), but this was not enough. 
The scanner survey firms overcame their technical difficulties, and clients again 
embraced their offerings. Repercussions were felt by both kinds of firms: MRCA 
is no longer in business, and A.C. Nielsen was swallowed by Dun & Bradstreet 
(and later divested, in small pieces).
Technological change, upstart competition, new financing mechanisms, and 
changing consumer habits conspired to create a strategic inflection point in the 
market research industry. Initial problems with technical implementation and 
service design of scanner panels confused customers and created the chaotic 
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For their part, supermarket chains invested in their own scanners. They used 
their now-proprietary scanner data to compute the profitability of each foot of shelf-
facing in every store. This led to the levying of ‘slotting allowances’, payments 
from the manufacturers to the store to allow the display of new products. Scanners 
had shifted power from the manufacturers to the stores – another instance of a 
strategic inflection in retailing.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
Andrew Grove emphasizes the rapidity of change, citing changes in transportation, 
retailing, microprocessors, and digital media. Particularly, he says, computer-
related industries are changing, and the macro environment in which they work 
is also changing, resulting in something new which will win out over the old 
way of doing business. Grove affirms that a company’s existing and potential 
competitors, how they play, their competence, their funding abilities and their 
aggressiveness, today and tomorrow, may lead to an inflection point. In addition, 
Grove sees substitution as the most ‘deadly’ form of transition point, causing and 
being caused by new techniques, new approaches, new technologies, new rules 
and new climates for doing business.  
Andrew Grove may well have intended for ‘strategic inflection point’ to mean 
something distinct from ‘mathematical inflection point’. Nonetheless, the above 
clarification and analysis are necessary if his expert views are to be folded into 
management theory. 
Moreover, Grove was indisputably (if implicitly) talking about chaos, using 
the mythical imagery (treks through the wilderness, the resolve of the leader, etc.) 
traditionally associated with order’s battle against chaos. This was an extraordinary 
thing for Grove to do. If ever there was a company managed ‘by the numbers,’ 
Intel, whose business is dominated by Moore’s Law, surely has been one. That 
Grove described something far more multi-dimensional was not grasped by 
Grove’s reviewers at the Decision Sciences Institute or at the American Society for 
Engineering Education (Ruppel, 1997, Smith, 2009) – perhaps not surprisingly, 
given the common perception of Intel’s by-the-numbers culture – which further 
justifies highlighting it here.
The research presented here is limited in that it is the authors’ considered 
opinion of the best technical definition of the terms inflection, instability, turbulence, 
etc. Others may reasonably differ. However, like other engineering disciplines, 
technology management deserves a uniform terminology, and we hope other 
researchers will either agree or argue the definitions here. Though we have shown 
that stability and instability follow each other throughout the product cycle, we are 
not yet able to specify the timing of these transitions. Though the short cases show 
the transitions have happened in a number of industries (semiconductors, books, 
research services), we cannot yet say that they are always to be expected in all of 
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these industries. This is grist for future research.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR ENTERPRISE SUSTAINABILITY
We have distinguished three points of dynamic tension in the life cycle of a product 
(or product line, technology, or industry): (i) the point at which innovation overcomes 
resistance to change (the AIR model’s tipping point), (ii) the point at which customers 
or competitors challenge a firm’s inertia and spur a product revitalization, and (iii) 
the substitution of a new technology for a mature technology. Each of these poses a 
strategic challenge to the firm, but only one is at a true inflection point. 
We have drawn the distinction among tipping points, inflection points, points of 
potential chaos, and other constructs implying instability or discontinuity. See Table 
1. We have confirmed that Grove, for the most part, was concerned with periods of 
chaos and volatility rather than inflection points. They are not the same; a graph of a 
chaotic regime is not differentiable, and cannot have inflection points. Moreover, at 
the (mathematical) inflection point of an s-curve, change slows; it does not accelerate 
as Grove implied.
Modis and Debecker’s powerful mathematical and empirical demonstration of 
the stability of logistic growth in the middle regime (and the potential instability 
at the extremes), together with Grove’s case studies and provocative terminology, 
show that the smooth revitalization and substitution curves of our textbooks are 
misleading, mathematically and managerially.
Modis and Debecker (1992) showed that chaos comes from substitution, the 
phenomenon Grove regards as specially dangerous. It does not generally arise from 
single-item diffusion, as implied by the earlier writers cited (and in some degree 
echoed) by Phillips and Kim (1996).
Dynamic tension points (ii) and (iii) above can be chaotic in the true technical 
sense, and this implies that strategic intent, alertness and flexibility, and luck are 
needed if the firm is to emerge viably (Phillips and Su, 2009). 
Indeed points (ii) and (iii) are structurally similar. Point (i), however, the AIR 
tipping point, can be monitored and predicted with some confidence.
Due care is called for in drawing correspondences between the math and the 
situation under study. Is there a reason why the continuous growth curve should 
better reflect the situational reality than the discrete form, or vice versa? Is it plausible 
that a parameter may vary or take on an unusual value? Does the situation call for 
representation via the (derivative) bell-shaped life cycle curve or the (integral) 
cumulative adoption curve? When the latter curve seems, under some parameter 
values, to violate monotonicity, is there a legitimate explanation? These questions 
are answered simply in the particular case of Figure 5 above, where the data seem to 
fit the theory very well. In other industries, they must be answered on a case-specific 
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Table 1. Map of colloquial/popular usages to technical meanings: 
Inflection points and related terms
Term Colloquial use in popular business literature Technical definition in the sciences or engineering
Inflection 
point
‘the nightmare moment… 
when massive change oc-
curs and a company must, 
virtually overnight, adapt or 
fall by the wayside’ (Grove, 
1996a).
In calculus, a point where the tangent crosses the curve, 
i.e., the second derivative equals zero.
Tipping 
point
‘The moment on the graph 
when the line starts to shoot 
straight upwards’ (Gladwell, 
2000). 
In systems theory, a critical threshold. ‘Complex systems 
can also exist in alternate stable states, in which they be-
have quite differently. The point at which they flip to the 
alternate state is the threshold or tipping point. A complex 
system in a stable state can be ‘flipped’ into another stable 
state by a disturbance that pushes it across the threshold.’ 
(Australian Academy of Science, 2006). The US National 
Science Foundation (National Science Foundation Adviso-
ry committee for Environmental Research and Education, 
2009) emphasized that the effect of the disturbance may be 
unpredictable.
Gladwell (2000) claimed the term is used in epide-
miology to denote the time at which a virus, passing from 
neighbour to neighbour, cannot be prevented from causing 
mass contagion.
Volatility Used ubiquitously to sug-
gest rapid growth, decline, 
or fluctuation.
In chemistry, ‘a chemical’s vapor pressure, which is the ba-
sis for its evaporation rate, boiling point and—if the chem-
ical is flammable—its flammability’ (Jonas, 2005).
In finance, ‘The relative rate at which the price of a 
security moves up and down. Volatility is found by calcu-
lating the annualized standard deviation of daily change in 
price.’ Measured by β, ‘a quantitative measure of the vola-
tility of a given stock, mutual fund, or portfolio, relative to 
the overall market, usually the S&P 500. Specifically, the 
performance the stock, fund or portfolio has experienced in 
the last 5 years as the S&P moved 1% up or down. A beta 
above 1 is more volatile than the overall market, while a 
beta below 1 is less volatile.’ (Source: Investorwords.com)
Chaos Commonly, an antonym of 
order. Indicates extreme 
unpredictability, uncon-
trolla-bility. May connote 
something to be feared. In 
a religious context, often 
associated with the work of 
the devil.
In physics, chemistry, engineering, and systems theory, 
(deterministic) chaos denotes an unpredictable trajecto-
ry, the history of which cannot be reconstructed from the 
system’s current state. Chaos may arise from the iteration 
of a function, or from small changes in the initial state of 
a system described by a set of differential equations. As 
the term deterministic chaos suggests, chaotic trajectories 
are not random. (Prigogine, 1984) often spoke of chaotic 
‘fluctuations.’
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Term Colloquial use in popular business literature Technical definition in the sciences or engineering
Disruption ‘Generally, disruptive tech-
nologies underperform es-
tablished products in main-
stream markets. But they… 
are typically cheaper, sim-
pler, smaller, and, frequent-
ly, more convenient to use’ 
(Christensen, 1998) 
In genetic engineering, a technology that enables muta-
tions to be rapidly generated in a specific gene or genes 
(http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chtitem.aspx-
?tid=1092&chid=1).
In supply chain management, an interruption in logis-
tics such as the one caused by the 2010 Icelandic volcanic 
eruption.
Dimov et al. (2008) used ‘disruption’ to describe the 
(quasi-)chaotic regime between successive growth curves 
following a product revitalization or substitution.
Christensen (1998) disruption is a special case of 
technology substitution, characterized by low price and 
initially limited functionality of the upstart technology.
Turbulence Seet (2005) summarizes 
Ansoff’s turbulence con-
struct: ‘Firms operate [in] 
five distinct turbulence lev-
els. At one extreme is the 
stable, placid environment, 
characterized by major tech-
nological breakthrough, and 
social-political upheavals.’ 
See also Drucker 
(1993): ‘In turbulent times 
an enterprise has to be 
managed both to withstand 
sudden blows and to avail 
itself of sudden unexpected 
opportunities.’
In fluid dynamics, the ‘state of fluid motion [that] arises 
when the speed of the fluid exceeds a specific threshold, 
below which viscous forces damp out the chaotic behav-
ior,’ characterized by ‘patches of zigzagging, often swirling 
fluid, moving randomly around and about the overall direc-
tion of motion (Moin and Kim, 1997) 
Turbulent fluid flow, approximated by the Navi-
er-Stokes equations, is contrasted to the more regular ‘lam-
inar’ flow of viscous fluids. Now thought to combine ran-
domness and deterministic chaos, turbulent flow has been 
one of the most intractable problems of classical physics.
Instability Widely used in economics, 
finance, psychology, poli-
tics, etc. to suggest poten-
tial or real sudden, drastic 
change 
[e.g., Foreign Policy 
(2009)].
In chemistry, “A stable compound occurs when the total 
energy of the combination has lower energy than the sepa-
rated atoms.” (http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/
chemical/bond.html) In an unstable compound the opposite 
is true, or the compound is so close to the threshold that 
a small addition of energy, e.g., an intruding photon, can 
destabilize it.
In systems theory, an ‘unusually or unnaturally 
large fluctuation that may lead to serious damage or system 
failure if allowed to continue beyond a certain limit’ (busi-
nessdictionary.com).
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATORS AND RESEARCHERS
Educators might consider:
(1) Emphasizing to students that in the real world, substitution trajectories are 
not necessarily everywhere differentiable. Nor are they always s-shaped; they 
may show a series of plateaux. Kicking the product into new growth following 
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(2) Bringing back an emphasis, in strategy classes, on the ‘turbulence’ ideas 
of Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) and Drucker (1993). 
(3) Jointly presenting mathematical, technological, managerial, and leader-
ship issues connected with periods of extreme industry challenge.
(4) Discussing the social and political contexts, and not just the business and 
technical details, of these challenges.
With regard to point 1 above, technology management researchers – under-
standing that the differentiability of e.g. utility functions has been a point of 
contention for decades between neoclassical and Austrian economists [see, 
e.g., Caplan (1999)], and that economics is currently criticized for subordinat-
ing theoretical accuracy to mathematical tractability – would do well to open 
a similar dialog in our own discipline. The fact that we have traditionally spo-
ken of ‘discontinuous innovations’ [e.g., Funk (2008)] makes this an overdue 
imperative.
Clearly, 
•	 Not all business or social phenomena strictly correspond to the hard-sci-
ences phenomena with which they share a name.
•	 Colloquial usages maintain legitimacy even when a word has a rigorous 
scientific meaning.
•	 Different research disciplines, whether hard or soft, may give different 
meanings to the same term.
•	 Researchers cannot control the terms appropriated by popular writers.
Nonetheless researchers are obliged to exercise care in nomenclature, not 
bending these four truths too far out of shape.
FURTHER MANAGERIAL AND SUSTAINABILITY IMPLICATIONS
Revitalizations, as is well known, may succeed or fail. Though the structural 
similarity of revitalization and substitution have been noted in passing 
elsewhere, we have made it explicit here, as it implies that chaos may arise 
in managerial situations more frequently than has been realised before now. 
This is a clear implication of Grove’s book, and is consistent with the Modis 
and Debecker (1992) results and Sood and Tellis’ (2004) finding that frequent 
revitalization attempts are the norm in technology markets.
The revitalization campaign depicted in Figure 4 reflects management’s 
deliberate variation of a diffusion parameter, that is, a renewed advertising 
push. The research shows that this parameter variation can induce chaos or 
Modis and Debecker (1992) volatility. Where managers have, prior to now, 
expected either sales growth or no incremental growth as a result of revitaliza-
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tion, it is now clear that a revitalization attempt can lead to puzzling fluctua-
tions.
It is possible that continuous monitoring of data can help managers 
distinguish among the three kinds of transition points discussed in this paper. 
The importance of the daily sales report is reinforced.
Volatility is abhorred by marketing VPs and operations managers, but 
tolerated by finance professionals. Marketers and strategists should find ways to 
respond to the inevitable role of chaos and quasi-chaos in the sales cycle. Part 
of this response lies in not killing a product too soon; what appears to be chaotic 
fluctuation may be just transitory volatility. Patience appears to be a virtue.
Most important from a managerial perspective is Modis and Debecker’s 
(1992) implication that ‘The generalised picture is one of alternating states of 
logistic growth and chaos’. The managerial styles appropriate for each regime 
differ markedly. Though Only the Paranoid Survive is a title that sells books, it 
could well be true that in stable times the skilled administrator survives; when 
chaos is on the horizon the alert, visionary, experienced manager survives; and 
when chaos has hit, the steadfast, inspirational leader represents the enterprise’ 
best chance of survival. 
In current US practice, executives are tagged as entrepreneurial managers, 
administrators, or turnaround experts, and steered into the situations where 
their respective skills are most needed. The results of this paper suggest that 
these categories almost, but not quite, match the environmental regimes under 
which technology businesses can expect to operate, and that the categories/
career tracks might well be re-examined.
ENDNOTES
1. The quotation refers to Grove (1996a). See also Grove (1996b, 1999). 
2. See Phillips  (2001) for development of these details of product revitaliza-
tion. The original concept is due to Levitt (1965).  
3. The ‘crossing the chasm’ phrase is due to Moore (2002), which introduced 
the venerable product life cycle concept to technology marketers. Evidence 
that the cycle is not smoothly bell-shaped but rather a series of plateaux, 
is due to Loch and Huberman (1999) and later to Sood and Tellis (2004). 
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